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28 JUN 2024

The ECHR has ruled on the case of the events in Crimea

28 JUN 2024

On 25 June, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights rendered a long-awaited judgment in an inter-State case of Ukraine v. Russia, pending trial by the Court. This is a combined case of two applications filed in 2014 and 2018 concerning the incidents in Crimea and the resulting violations of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In 2020, after the first public hearing in the case, which was attended by representatives of both States, the ECHR deemed both applications admissible and invited the parties to submit their positions (“memorials”) on the substance until February 28, 2022. By this date, both sides had submitted written memorials. However, after being expelled from the Council of Europe, Russia ceased communication with the Court and ignored the invitation to a substantive hearing scheduled for November 8, 2023. Thus, only the legal representatives of Ukraine presented their position before the Court, and the ECHR judges had to analyze the arguments of the respondent state based only on the previously submitted documents.

For each of the alleged violations of the rights of its citizens, Ukraine, as the applicant Government, had to present to the European Court the facts of individual violations of the rights of several people and to prove the existence of so-called “administrative practice” — a pattern of identical or similar violations that were numerous and interconnected enough to form a systematic regularity that would not be considered “lawful” under the Convention. Furthermore, to establish the presence of this “administrative practice”, Ukraine needed to prove that Russia treats these violations with “official tolerance”, meaning that it does not prevent them and even encourages them.

Within the framework of these two applications, Ukraine claimed violations described below.

The position of Ukraine

Enforced disappearances and the lack of an effective investigation under Article 2 of the Convention

Ukraine claimed that since what they have consistently classified as the “occupation”, there had been forty-three documented cases of “enforced disappearance” in Crimea. In all of these cases Russia failed to take any reasonable steps to ensure an effective independent investigation process. These forty-three cases were evidenced by international organisations, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (“HRMMU”), and corresponded to the figure given by the Russian Federation Ombudsperson, Ella Pamfilova, in the annual report for 2014.

The Ukrainian representatives clarified that they consider Russia to be responsible for these disappearances. In the reports, the OHCHR observed the involvement of the “Crimean Self Defence Forces” and associated Russian paramilitary groups in the enforced disappearance of persons who were perceived as “pro-Ukrainian”.

Ill-treatment and unlawful detention under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention

The Ukrainian State, referring to the testimonies of the Ukrainian military recorded in the OHCHR report, claimed that torture had been inflicted on detainees, both military and civilians. Those who had been illegally detained testified that they had been deprived of sleep, received violent threats to them and their families, stripped and bound, beaten, burned with cigarettes, cut with a knife, electrocuted and shot multiple times with a pneumatic gun. One of the detainees had been subjected to a mock execution. The detained women were also exposed to other forms of humiliation, such as being stripped naked, strangled with shoelaces, and having their hair cut off with a knife.

Regarding the arbitrary deprivation of liberty, the applicant Government pointed out that during the examined period, both persons with pro-Ukrainian political views and members of the Crimean Tatar community in particular were actively detained.

Extending the application of Russian law to Crimea with the result that the courts in Crimea could not be considered to have been “established by law” within the meaning of Article 6. Violation of Article 7 of the Convention on punishment solely on the basis of law

On March 21, 2014, the President of Russia signed a new Federal Constitutional Law “On the admission to the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation in the Russian Federation of new subjects - the Republic of Crimea and the city of federal significance of Sevastopol”. According to this law, courts of the Russian Federation were to be created in accordance with the judicial system and laws of the Russian Federation on the territories of Crimea during the transition period.

According to the applicant Government’s opinion, this substitution of the laws in force violated international humanitarian law, in particular the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

Так, по мнению украинской стороны, жителей Крымского полуострова:

The Ukrainian side argues that people on the Crimean Peninsula:

had been charged and convicted on the basis of the arbitrary and politically motivated application of Russian criminal law;
had appeal proceedings under Ukrainian law arbitrarily terminated;
had their prison sentences arbitrarily reclassified in accordance with Russian Federation law, including to their detriment.

Ukraine also noted that many judges appointed to the Russian courts established in Crimea had previously held the same position in the Ukrainian justice system. Thus, in Ukraine's opinion, a number of previously appointed Ukrainian judges had switched sides and engaged in activities against the interests of Ukraine and Ukrainians, in breach of their oath of office and in favour of demands imposed by a foreign power. Consequently, the applicant Government submitted that those “judges” could not be considered independent and impartial, nor could any “court” or “tribunal” over which they presided be considered to be a competent judicial authority in the meaning of the Article 6 of the Convention.

In the second application filed in 2018, Ukraine also claimed the illegality of the sentences handed down by the new courts in Crimea, this time arguing that it violated Article 7 of the Convention, which states that “no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed”.

Alleged violations of the right to respect for private and family life and the right to housing in the meaning of the Article 8 of the Convention

Impossibility of opting out of Russian Federation citizenship

The “Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the Accession of the Republic of Crimea in the Russian Federation and on Forming New Constituent Entities within the Russian Federation” (“Accession Treaty”) and the Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ on admitting the “Republic of Crimea” to the Russian Federation provided that Russian citizenship was to be automatically imposed on persons permanently residing in Crimea, unless a particular resident renounced it in written form within one month.

Details of the opt-out procedure had only been published by the Federal Migration Service (FMS) on 1 April 2014 (some seventeen days before the deadline). Although applications for renunciation of Russian citizenship were supposed to be accepted from 18 March to 18 April 2014, in practice they had only been accepted from 1 to 17 April 2014.

The representatives of Ukraine noted that Federal Migration Service centres had not been capable of processing opt-out requests. There had been a total of nine operating centres in Crimea, and they had been difficult to access for Crimean residents living in the countryside. Some procedural requirements for submitting the application had been uncertain and had evolved arbitrarily over time. Furthermore, Russian citizenship was also automatically granted to children who were held in orphanages and in boarding schools at the time, persons in psychiatric institutions and persons who were in custody or in places of detention (including cases of detention by the Russian authorities), as well as children born after March 18, 2014.

Those peninsula residents who did “opt out” subsequently had to apply for Russian citizenship in order, for example, to receive pension payments or to obtain ownership of their housing, land or vehiсle. Without citizenship they were also prevented from voting and being elected, registering a religious community, and applying to hold a public meeting.

Last but not least, many Ukrainian citizens of Crimea feared reprisals if they applied for renunciation of Russian citizenship. Many of those who objected to the imposition of Russian citizenship had been dismissed; civil servants and employees of municipal institutions were required not just to accept Russian citizenship, but also to renounce their Ukrainian citizenship. Clerks who did not have Russian citizenship had been forbidden to carry out church services in Crimea. A number of Ukrainian citizens who refused to accept Russian citizenship had been consequently forcibly deported outside the Crimean Peninsula to mainland Ukraine for violation of migration legislation: in the period from 27 February 2014 to 26 August 2015, there had been over 100 deportations.

Arbitrary raids of private dwelling houses

Ukraine submitted that the local administration subordinated to the Russian Federation systematically carried out arbitrary raids in private dwelling houses and/or offices “on the pretext of an investigation into offenses under the Anti-Extremist Law”.

Forcible transfer of convicts

According to the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union and Regional Centre for Human Rights, by December 2017, more than 4,700 Ukrainian prisoners had been transferred from the territory of Crimea to 69 different correctional institutions, spread across the Russian Federation. Such transfers many hundreds of kilometers away from the peninsula had deprived families of many prisoners of an opportunity to visit them, which also violated the prisoners' rights to respect for family life.

Ukrainian film director Oleg Sentsov stated that following his transfer to the detention facility in Moscow, the Ukrainian ambassador was unable to visit him, as Russian authorities claimed that Sentsov was a Russian citizen. The Ukrainian side claimed that the Russian authorities had prevented Ukrainian citizens from delivering care packages to their close relatives detained by Russia.

Harassment and intimidation of religious leaders not conforming to the Russian Orthodox faith, arbitrary raids of places of worship and confiscation of religious property, in breach of Article 9 of the Convention

According to the statements of the applicant Government, the local administration subordinated to the Russian Federation had tried either to establish control over Ukrainian religious communities in Crimea or to eradicate and oust them from Crimea. The communities of the UOC‑MP were in a privileged position. They were among the first which had managed to re-register in Crimea and were able freely to conduct their religious and other activities. The UOC-MP actively cooperated with the Russian Armed Forces and its Black Sea Fleet.

Other religious movements had been subjected to various forms of discrimination. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine (the OCU has the status of an autocephalous church from the Patriarchate of Constantinople – Memorial HRDC) had faced persecution on the territory of Crimea, which had been directly instigated by high-ranked Russian officials. For instance, the President of the Russian Federation had called the OCU a “false project provoking intolerance and having nothing to do with freedom of religion”, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs had said on numerous occasions that the separation of the OCU from the Russian Orthodox Church was “illegal” and that it had been carried out on the instructions of the Government of the United States of America.

The ban of Jehovah's Witnesses in force in the Russian Federation had been extended to the territory of Crimea. Furthermore, the new administration had also applied several methods of intimidation and pressure to compel the Crimean Muslim community to cooperate. Incidents included the setting on fire of mosques in Simferopol and the village of Sonyachna Dolyna in 2014; unreasonable and unlawful searches of mosques by law-enforcement authorities; and restrictions on the distribution of Muslim literature under the guise of combating extremism. Non-conformist Muslim religious groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (considered a terrorist organisation and banned in Russia; not banned in Ukraine) had been persecuted.

Suppression of non-Russian media, including the closure of Ukrainian and Tatar television stations, in breach of Article 10 of the Convention

The applicant Government reported the shutting down of non-Russian television stations, attacks on journalists, bans on newspapers and the denial of licences to media outlets deemed critical of the Russian “occupation”.

In March 2014, all editorial offices were given a deadline for re‑registration under Russian law. Media outlets that remained in Crimea and failed to act in accordance with Russian legislation were forced to cease their activities.

All Ukrainian television channels had been blocked and their frequencies were used by Russian television channels. For example, in June 2014 Chernomorskaya TRC – one of the largest television companies in Crimea – was blocked from broadcasting. Its property was subsequently seized and the new authorities began using its transmitters to broadcast the Russian Rossiya-24 television channel. The servers of ATR, the main Crimean Tatar TV channel broadcasting to Crimea, Turkey and European countries, were also seized and transferred to other TV channels. Many other Crimean editorial offices of TV channels, periodicals, radio stations, and online media had faced the same repressive practices.

Reporters Without Borders reported that, as at 11 August 2014, most Crimean Internet Service Providers had been blocked and access to Ukrainian news websites was being blocked as well. Journalists themselves had also been persecuted: in March 2014, the Center for Investigative Journalism in Crimea recorded 85 cases of attacks on journalists. This was followed by a prolonged period of systematic intimidation of journalists which included searches and arbitrary detention.

The office of the Centre for Investigative Journalism had been subsequently subjected to the arbitrary search. Faced with threats, the Centre’s staff fled Crimea and moved to mainland Ukraine. Their website was eventually blocked.

Between 2014 and 2019 more than 350 acts involving harassment of journalists and bloggers in Crimea had been documented. This administrative practice had intensified since that time. According to the Ukrainian PEN Centre, the Russian authorities had imprisoned 162 Ukrainian journalists, activists and writers. The deported journalists were banned from visiting Crimea for 10 to 35 years.

According to the UN, as of the beginning of 2014, about 3,000 mass media outlets were registered in Crimea, whilst the press service of the Roskomnadzor, as of 1 April 2015, indicated only 232 media outlets registered in Crimea. Finally, according to the 2017 estimates of the international organisation Freedom House, since 2014 the level of freedom of speech in Crimea had fallen to one of the worst in the world. The organisation’s report stated that on a 100-point scale, where 100 was the worst indicator, Crimea received ninety-four points and was included in the list of the “worst of the worst” territories in the world.

Prohibition of public gatherings and demonstrations, as well as intimidation and arbitrary detention of organisers of demonstrations in violation of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11 of the Convention

In substantiating this complaint, Ukraine recalled the cases of suppressed peaceful assemblies and detentions of their participants. In March 2014, the “Crimean self-defense forces” (CSDF) violently disrupted a peaceful demonstration to commemorate the 200th anniversary of Taras Shevchenko, a famous Ukrainian poet and public figure. Several persons were detained following the use of Ukrainian symbols at the demonstration. In June 2014, the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (“Crimean Tatar National Assembly”) was denied permission to hold a cultural event dedicated to the Crimean Tatar flag. In August 2014, several persons were detained after they had laid flowers at a monument for Taras Shevchenko.

All rallies in support of the territorial integrity of Ukraine were constantly attacked by members of the CSDF. Several civil activists who openly protested against Russia’s actions in Crimea had been kidnapped. All of them were unlawfully detained, and many of them were tortured. The most well-known case of prosecution was the so-called “Case of 26 February” in relation to the participation in a peaceful meeting of the Mejlis in support of Ukraine’s sovereignty in Simferopol.

Expropriation without compensation of property from civilians and private enterprises in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

The international reports submitted by the applicant Government note that there was a systemic pattern of expropriation of private property without compensation.

International NGOs documented dozens of cases of appropriation of private property, including agro-industrial enterprises, major banks, property belonging to associations, media and telecommunications companies, energy companies, construction and transport companies, and tourism-sector enterprises. They also found that “aside from big commercial enterprises, appropriations had taken place against small businesses, mainly belonging to Crimean Tatars and persons in actual or perceived opposition” to the emergence of the Russian authorities on the peninsula.

On 2 April 2014 the Russian Federation passed the Federal Law “On the Financial System Specifics of the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol for a Transition Period” which enabled the Russian Central Bank to terminate licences of Ukrainian banks operating in Crimea, and to seize all property in the possession of banks. The matter was eventually the subject of an arbitration award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration – the International Arbitration Tribunal in The Hague.

Ukraine also noted the practice of demolition of houses of Crimean Tatars on the territory of Crimea by the Russian administration and the fact that the so-called “foreigners” – Crimean residents without Russian citizenship – lost their land plots in new “border areas” as a result of an enforced sale or nationalization. On 27 May 2015 Russia’s Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law on nationalisation of property in Crimea.

Suppression of the Ukrainian language in schools and persecution of Ukrainian-speaking children at school in violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1

The submitted reports indicate that before 2014 seven schools of general education teaching in Ukrainian and fifteen schools teaching in the Crimean Tatar language functioned on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Three educational institutions with Ukrainian as the language of instruction had ceased their activities.Between 2014 and 2015 the number of children studying in Ukrainian decreased from 12,600 in the previous school year to 2,000. The number of pupils studying Ukrainian decreased from 162,700 to 39,100.

Ukraine alleges that local authorities were putting pressure on educational institutions which continued to teach in Ukrainian. Pressure had also been exerted on parents who wanted to teach their children in their native language, and psychological and even physical pressure had been applied to children in Ukrainian classrooms, both from the teaching staff and from their peers — teachers did not stop conflicts based on national hatred.

Restriction of freedom of movement between Crimea and mainland Ukraine, resulting from the de facto transformation (by the Russian Federation) of the administrative delimitation line into a border (between the Russian Federation and Ukraine) in violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4

By the end of April 2014, the Russian Federation authorities had established a border at the northern entrance to Crimea, thereby creating a de facto State border between mainland Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula that applied to all inhabitants of Crimea wishing to leave, and all inhabitants of mainland Ukraine wishing to enter. Ukrainian lawyers presented testimonies from witnesses who wanted to enter Crimea: they had been stopped and detained at the checkpoint controlled by the “Crimean self-defence forces”. Some witnesses claimed to have been tortured and kept in inhuman conditions, after which they had been removed from Crimea.

Furthermore, the Russian Federation resorted to the practice of expulsion of Crimean residents who refused or failed to receive Russian citizenship and directly transferred groups of individuals from Crimea. A major example was the so-called “Train of hope” programme initiated by Russia in 2014. It was used to transfer orphans and children deprived of parental care from Crimea to the territory of Russia for their adoption by Russian citizens and their subsequent assimilation there.

Targeting Crimean Tatars in breach of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4

Ukraine submitted that the Russian Federation was responsible for discriminatory legal and administrative measures aimed at Crimean Tatars, which were effected through, inter alia, the following: frequent summoning of Tatars by the police and the Public Prosecutor of Crimea; the initiation of criminal proceedings against Tatars; the prohibition of broadcasting of Tatar television channels; the prohibition of public meetings; and restrictions on freedom of movement through the imposition of a de facto State border which particularly affected Crimean Tatars. The Tatar’s Muslim religious practices were also targeted. The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People had been banned as being an “extremist organisation”.

The intimidation of Ukrainians and suppression of political opposition as targets of the above-mentioned violations in the breach of Article 18 of the Convention

In the second application filed in 2018, Ukraine additionally claimed a violation of article 18 of the Convention, the so-called article “on the political nature” of violations. The applicant Government noted that all mentioned violations had ultimately been aimed at the intimidation of Ukrainians and the suppression of any political opposition to Russian policies in Crimea.

The response of Russia

The Court cited the respondent Government’s arguments presented in the last memorial submitted to the Grand Chamber on 28 February 2022.

Russia claimed that for most of the alleged violations, Ukraine had not proven the existence of “administrative practices”, i.e. systematic, repeated violations of a particular right. Russia indicated that the cases referred to by Ukraine were isolated, vague, and in some of them the alleged victims could not be identified or had denied their claims of rights violations. Russia also referred to the unacceptability of such complaints due to the fact that the alleged victims did not try to exhaust domestic remedies. Instead, in some cases the alleged victims had refused to cooperate with the Russian investigating authorities. In view of this, according to Russian representatives, Ukraine cannot claim that the Russian authorities refused to take measures to investigate the complaints and punish the perpetrators and were “tolerant” of discriminatory practices.

Addressing the complaint about the new courts established in Crimea and the appointment of new judges, the Russian side cited its relevant legislation and concluded that it “had taken the necessary legislative and other measures in a timely manner to ensure the continuity of justice in the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol” during the transitional period”.

In response to Ukraine's arguments about the imposition of Russian citizenship, Russia also cited the norms of its legislation, indicating that it provides for the possibility of voluntary withdrawal of Russian citizenship, subject to the notification procedure. The respondent Government also referred to the Accession Treaty as an international agreement, serving as the basis for the creation of new relevant legal norms in domestic legislation.

In response to the complaint regarding the violation of the right to freedom of religion, Russia also provided excerpts from its legislation, noting that the termination of lease agreements with religious organizations was linked to their refusal to comply the requirements of the legislation of the Russian Federation (on the registration of religious organizations) and had nothing to do with their activities.

A similar argument followed in response to the complaint about the restriction of media activities: Russia appealed to the fact that the media could continue their work if they registered in accordance with the new existing legislation and obtained licenses issued by the Roskomnadzor authorities, while TV and radio channels received permits for the use of television and radio frequencies. The respondent Government noted that the media outlets and TV channels that ceased broadcasting either failed to register properly, or the documents they submitted did not meet the legal requirements and were subject to return. This was the case, among others, with the Chernomorskaya Television and Radio Company and the ATR television channel. Russia also provided examples of media outlets that continued to operate or were established after March 2014, such as the Autonomous Non-Profit Organisation “Public Crimean Tatar TV and Radio Company”.

Regarding the violation of the right to peaceful assembly, the Russian side responded that, in the examples provided by Ukraine, the organisers of the public events had failed to coordinate with the local authorities, which demonstrated their reluctance to resolve the disagreement regarding the place and/or time of the public events.

In response to the complaint regarding the failure to comply with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on the Protection of Property, Russia stated that the National Council of the Republic of Crimea adopted a decree on Crimea’s independence before the referendum, on March 17, 2014. According to this decree, all institutions, enterprises, and other organizations, as well as property of Ukraine, to be regarded, as of the day of adoption of the decree, as property of the “Republic of Crimea”. In this regard, Russia argued that the "transfer of immovable property into State ownership of the Republic of Crimea" was legal.

On the issue of the nationalization of Ukrainian banks, Russia noted that the National Bank of Ukraine had independently revoked or annulled the banking licenses of branches located in Crimea, after which the Ukrainian banks terminated the operation of these branches. Russia also noted that a considerable number of Ukrainian banks ceased to fulfil their obligations to creditors and depositors and the National Bank of Ukraine failed to take any countermeasures.

Regarding education in schools in Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages, Russia stated that the right to such education was ensured, and in the 2014/2015 academic year fifty-four schools had provided classes in the Ukrainian language, and sixty-two schools had provided classes in the Crimean Tatar language. Furthermore, in a number of schools, both languages were taught as a compulsory part of the curriculum. The respondent Government also indicated that in 2015, at the request of the Ministry of Education, Science, and Youth of the “Republic of Crimea”, publishers had received orders for the production of more than sixty textbooks in Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian for national schools. The state did not respond to the claim of bullying of Ukrainian-speaking and Tatar-speaking children by their peers and teachers.

Regarding the established border between the states, Russia cited its legislation, according to which “the protection of the State Border ensures the vital interests of the individual, society and the State on the State border within the border territory”.

Finally, in response to the complaint of discrimination and persecution of Crimean Tatars in Crimea, Russia provided statistics on the criminal prosecution of individuals residing in the republic, which showed that of all the individuals prosecuted over the year, only 10-15% were Ukrainians, and no more than 5% were Crimean Tatars.

The ECHR’s assessment

First of all, the ECHR reiterated that Russia's withdrawal or exclusion from the Council of Europe “does not release it from its duty to cooperate with the Convention bodies”.

The ECHR further determined that Russia is indeed responsible for the events in Crimea: “The Court established “beyond reasonable doubt” that during the entire period under consideration, namely between 27 February 2014 and 26 August 2015, the respondent State had exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction over Crimea on account of “effective control””. The Court noted that in relation to the first period (between 27 February and 18 March 2014), Russia's “effective control”, and therefore jurisdiction, was based on the military presence, strength and conduct of the Russian military forces in Crimea. In relation to the second period (from 18 March 2014 onwards) it was, in fact, common ground between the parties that the respondent State had exercised jurisdiction over Crimea after 18 March 2014.

The Court also established that those events that had taken place on the territory of the so-called DPR and LPR (such as the capture of one of the Ukrainian citizens) also fall within the Russian Federation’s jurisdiction. The Court reiterated that in its admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia it found that, as a result of Russia’s military presence in eastern Ukraine and the decisive degree of influence and control it enjoyed over the areas under separatist control in eastern Ukraine as a result of its military, political and economic support to the separatist entities, those areas had been, from 11 May 2014 and subsequently, under the effective control of the Russian Federation.

Despite the fact that the Court used the term “occupation” exclusively in quotation marks throughout the ruling, it confirmed that the alleged violations should be considered, among other things, in the light of international humanitarian law, namely the Fourth Geneva Convention, and cited a number of provisions on the obligations of the “occupying authorities”/“occupation forces” to comply with those or other rights in the “occupied territory”.

Specifically, regarding the issue of the transition from Ukrainian legislation to Russian legislation in Crimea, the Court pointed out that the relevant rules of IHL clearly provide that “the law pre-dating the occupation should continue to apply in the territory on which another State exercises “effective control”, unless there are grounds for any of the exceptions listed in those rules”. In the present case, this means that the courts in Crimea were required to continue to apply “the whole of the law (civil law and penal law)” of Ukraine and not to replace it with Russian legislation unless “necessary””.

As for the substance of the ruling, the Court agreed with all of Ukraine's arguments and confirmed the existence of relevant administrative practices – systematic violations of the rights of Ukrainians in Crimea – in the actions of the Russian Federation, with the exception of one. Ukraine filed a complaint that Russia had not facilitated the transfer of Ukrainian political prisoners to the territory of Ukraine, which violated Article 8 of the Convention on the right to respect for private and family life. Ukraine also suggested that Russia's refusals of such requests violate the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons.

The ECHR considered that the issue raised was not within the scope of the rights protected by Article 8. The Court noted that the provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons are confined to providing an inter-State procedural framework for such transfer. This Convention does not generate an immediate obligation to transfer prisoners per se. There is no such obligation in Russian legislation either. As a result, the ECHR considered this complaint to be outside the jurisdiction of the Court.

However, the Court found a violation in the administrative practice of transferring prisoners to penal facilities on the internationally recognized territory of the Russian Federation and noted that these transfers were incompatible with Article 8 of the Convention due to violations of the right to respect for family life of Crimean prisoners

Thus, the ECHR ruled that various administrative practices employed by the Russian Federation in Crimea violated Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, and also confirmed that “there has been a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Articles 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11 of the Convention”, due to the fact that the aforementioned violations had an ultimate political purpose “to punish and silence any political opposition”.

The Court considered that Russia must take every necessary measure, as soon as possible, to secure the safe return of the prisoners transferred from Crimea to penal facilities located on the Russian Federation’s territory. Regarding the issue of financial compensation, the Court refrained from making a determination at this stage and noted that it reserves the right to address this matter in the future.

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